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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20010761-CA

MATTHEW DESPAIN,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to operation of a clandestine
laboratory, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (Supp.
2001) in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Lynn W. Davis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §782a-3(2)(e)(1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Should officers be permitted to routinely ask whether a motorist
possesses any weapons during a traffic stop?
Standard of Review: "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-

erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the
facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909
(Utah 1996).
Issue No. 2: Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, where the officers
knew of defendant's prior arrest for possession of a concealed weapon and where
defendant exhibited suspicions behavior, did the officers have reasonable suspicion to ask
whether defendant possessed any weapons?
Standard of Review: (same as above).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Therightof the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with operation of a clandestine laboratory,
possession or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, both second degree
felonies, transportation or possession of items prohibited in a correctional and mental
health facility, a third degree felony, reckless cndangerment, a class A misdemeanor,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, both class
B misdemeanors. R. 3-5. A forfeiture demand was also entered. Id. Defendant filed a
2

motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle and attached trailer.
R. 38-45. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a written ruling denying
defendant's motion. R. 147:22.
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to Count I of the charges, reserving his
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 64-71, 74-75.
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years. R. 7781. That sentence was suspended, however, and defendant was ordered to serve nine
months in jail and 36 months probation. Id. The court also ordered defendant's forfeiture
of $1,416.00 cash found in the search. R. 72-73. Defendant timely appeals his
conviction. R. 84-85.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Armed and dangerous. Shortly after midnight on November 6, 1999, while on
patrol, Officers Troy Slaugh and Rusty Olsen observed a pickup truck pulling a large
trailer with no license plate lights proceeding through a nearby intersection. R. 87:81-82;
106:5-6, 9-10. A check of the truck's license plate number revealed that the vehicle was
registered to defendant. R. 87:82; 106:6, 39. Officer Slaugh immediately remembered
defendant's namefroman encounter which occurred a month prior where defendant was

j

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying
defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App.
1997). The facts are taken from testimony given at the suppression hearing and at the
preliminary hearing upon which the trial court relied on in making its decision. See R.
106:3-4.
3

found to be in possession of drugs and a concealed handgun. R. 106:39-40. As a result
of that encounter, Officer Slaugh considered defendant to be "armed and dangerous." R.
106:40.
Recognizing a license plate violation, the officers stopped defendant and parked
their patrol car behind his trailer on the side of the road. R. 87:82; 106:6, 9. The area
was dark and visibility was extremely limited, R. 87:78. Officer Slaugh began walking
toward the driver's side of defendant's vehicle while Officer Olsen went toward the
passenger side. R. 87:77; 106:7.2 As the officers neared the back of defendant's truck, a
large black rottweiler aggressively lunged at Officer Slaugh, barking uncontrollably from
inside the open trick bed. R. 87:83-84; 106:7. Fearing that the dog would attack, the
officers drew their service weapons and retreated toward the back of the trailer. R. 87:83;
106:7-8. At that point, defendant exited his vehicle, shut his door, and stood beside it. R.
106:8. Officer Slaugh yelled to defendant to meet him behind the trailer, away from the
dog. Id. Defendant did not comply. Id. Instead, he got back in his vehicle and shut his
door. Id. The officers could not see what defendant was doing inside the vehicle. R.
87:78; 106:8-9.
After Officer Slaugh called a second time, defendant exited his vehicle and met the
officers behind his trailer. R. 106:9. Defendant was dressed in blue jeans and a loose
plaid shirt which he wore untucked, completely covering his waist and extending down to

2

Although Officer Olsen was not in uniform, he was on duty and was carrying his
badge and service weapon. R. 106:9.
4

his upper thigh. R. 106:12, 15,43. When Officer Slaugh asked to see defendant's driver's
license and registration, defendant moved his hands toward his back pocket. R. 106:10,
43. Noticing that defendant's waistband was concealed, Officer Olsen immediately asked
defendant "if he had any weapons on him." R. 106:10. In response, defendant shifted his
hands towards his waist area, stating that he had two knifes. R. 106:11,43. Before
defendant moved any further, Officer Olsen grabbed defendant and retrieved a large
hunting-style knife with a sharp six-inch blade which was attached to defendant's belt and
placed horizontally across defendant's stomach. R. 87:78; 106:11-12, 15. The knife was
loosely sheathed, easily accessible, and well concealed from view under defendant's shirt.
R. 87:78; 106:11-13, 15-16,43-44. The officer also retrieved a smaller pocket knife
located on defendant's right hip, also attached to his belt with a sheath. R. 87:78; 106:13.
After defendant had been disarmed, Officer Slaugh returned to his vehicle to
perform a records check on defendant's driver's license and to check Utah Code Ann. §§
76-10-501 and 76-10-504, to determine whether defendant's large knife hidden under his
shirt constituted a concealed dangerous weapon. R. 106:13-14. Based on the language of
the two statutes, Officer Slaugh concluded that defendant had violated the law. R.
106:14. Defendant was placed under arrest for possession of a concealed dangerous
weapon. R. 106:16.
The search. Incident to defendant's arrest, the officers arranged for a passenger,
defendant's wife, to restrain and remove the dog, and executed a search of defendant's
truck. R. 106:16-17. While searching, the officers discovered a small container of
5

marijuana and a glass pipe containing methamphetamine crystals in the cab of the truck.
R. 106:19-21, 23-24, 59-63. Inside a backpack located in the bed of the truck, officers
found a glass pipe containing marijuana residue and a small blue container of marijuana.
R. 106:19,22.
The officers also inventoried defendant's trailer. R. 106:24-25. Inside the trailer
they found various items consistent with a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory,
including a glass tube approximately five feet long, a small glass tube about eleven inches
long with a rubber connector attached to it, a trash sack full of small containers identical
to those found in the in the truck, and large barrels of unknown chemicals. R. 106:25-26,
36-37, 63-65. Given the likelihood that the chemicals were hazardous, the officers ceased
the inventory and arranged for defendant's truck and trailer to be towed to the impound
lot. R. 106:27-28,
The next day, upon resuming their inventory of the trailer, the officers found a
mason jar full of blue crystal iodine pellets of the type used to produce methamphetamine,
more small containers, and a glass flask. R. 106:28-32, 38, 65-66. At that point, Officer
Slaugh was convinced that the trailer contained a methamphetamine laboratory so he
contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration, applied for and received a search
warrant, and continued to inventory the contents of the trailer. R. 106:32, 38. That
search revealed several bottles of hydrogen peroxide and ethyl alcohol, two liquid
chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine. R. 106:32-33, 38-39.

6

Suppression hearing. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that
Officer's Olsen's question as whether defendant possessed any weapons constituted an
illegal detention. R. 38-45. After reviewing the evidence offered at the suppression
hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion, holding that defendant was not
unreasonably detained when the question was asked, and that Officer Slaugh's knowledge
of defendant's very recent possession of a concealed weapon was sufficient to permit the
question. R. 46-52.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
POINT I: Defendant claims that Officer Olsen's question during a traffic stop as
to whether defendant possessed any weapons was constitutionally improper. However, in
United States v. Holt, based on the United States Supreme Court's longstanding
recognition of the inherent dangers of traffic stops, the Tenth Circuit recently held that an
officer may ask a motorist if he possesses any loaded weapons regardless of whether he
has reasonable suspicion or a subjective fear that the motorist is armed. This Court
should adopt that precedent.
When balancing a motorist's privacy interests against the State's strong interests in
protecting police officers placed in precarious positions during traffic stops, it is clear that
the motorist's interests are outweighed. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the
dangerous nature of traffic stops and the need for additional reasonable precautions to
protect officers in the line of duty. Furthermore, Utah courts have stated that an officer
can order the passengers out of a vehicle and detain them long enough to perform a
7

warrants check without reasonable suspicion. A brief question about weapons is no more
intrusive than those accepted practices. In any event, a motorist generally expects an
officer to take reasonable precautions to protect his or her safety. Where the State's
strong interests in protecting police officers outweighs the privacy interests of a motorist,
this Court should follow Holt, holding that an officer may briefly ask a motorist if he or
she possesses any weapons, irrespective of whether that officer has reasonable suspicion
that the motorist is armed.
POINT II: Notwithstanding the applicability of Holt9 under a totality of the
circumstances the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant
was armed. When combined with other factors, Officer Slaugh's knowledge of
defendant's recent prior encounter with police wherein defendant was found to be in
possession of narcotics and a concealed handgun, was enough to create a reasonable
suspicion that defendant was presently armed. Those factors included defendant's
defiance of Officer Slaugh's order to meet him behind the trailer away from defendant's
aggressive dog, the fact that the officers could not view defendant's actions when he
reentered his vehicle, the remote location and late hour when the traffic stop occurred,
and the fact that when defendant finally complied with the officers' orders to exit his
vehicle, his waist area was completely concealed by his untucked shirt. Accordingly, a
reasonably careful officer under those circumstances would have believed that defendant
was presently armed and dangerous. Thus, Officer Olsen's question was justified to
protect both officers' safety.
8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONSISTENT WITH TENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT,
OFFICERS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ASK
WHETHER A MOTORIST POSSESSES ANY
WEAPONS DURING A TRAFFIC STOP
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not suppressing evidence obtained
through a search of his vehicle and trailer during a routine traffic stop. Br. of Aplt. at 719. Specifically, defendant argues that his arrest resulting from Officer Olsen's question
as to whether defendant possessed any weapons was illegal because the question was
beyond the scope of the original purpose for the traffic stop and was unsupported by
reasonable suspicion. Id. Thus, defendant claims that the evidence obtained through the
search incident to his arrest was tainted by the prior illegality and therefore inadmissable.
Id?
Defendant's objection to Officer Olsen's question ignores both the United States
Supreme Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's express recognition of the dangerous
nature of traffic stops. Moreover, in United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.
2001), the Tenth Circuit recently held that regardless of whether an officer has any
reasonable suspicion that the motorist possesses a weapon or whether an officer
subjectively fears the motorist, an officer may ask a motorist if he or she possesses any

3

On appeal, defendant does not challenge appropriateness of the search incident to
his arrest. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-20. Therefore, his claim hinges only on the legality of his
arrest.

9

loaded weapons. Id. at 1226. This Court should adopt that rule.
In Holt, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol established a driver's license checkpoint at
approximately 10:30 in the evening. Id. at 1218. When Holt approached the checkpoint,
Officer Tucker noticed that Holt was not wearing a seatbelt. Id. Holt was asked to
produce his driver's license, exit his vehicle, and join Officer Tucker in his patrol car. Id.
While in the patrol car, Officer Tucker asked Holt if "there was anything in [Holt's]
vehicle [that Officer Tucker] should know about such as loaded weapons." Id. Holt
responded that there was a loaded pistol behind the passenger seat of his vehicle. Id.
After asking for Holt's consent to search his vehicle, Officer Tucker found the loaded
pistol where Holt had said it would be. Id. at 1219. The encounter lasted approximately
three to four minutes. Id. A subsequent search of the back of Holt's vehicle revealed
drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. Later, based on Holt's motion, the district court
suppressed the gun and the contraband found in his vehicle. Id. The government
appealed the district court's ruling. Id.
Citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals laid out the general principles for determining whether an officer can ask a
motorist if he or she possesses any weapons.
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular invasion of a
citizen's personal security. Reasonableness, of course, depends on a
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.
Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09). Accordingly, under a totality
10

of the circumstances test, the Tenth Circuit "assess[ed] the reasonableness of [the] traffic
stop based on an observed violation by considering the scope of the officer's actions and
balancing the motorist's legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's lawenforcement-related interests." Id.
In applying that balance, the Tenth Circuit noted that "a motorist expects an officer
to take reasonable measures to protect officer safety during the stop." Given that, the
courts have recognized that the government's strong interest in officer safety, when not
too intrusive, outweighs the motorist's interests. Id. As examples the Holt court cited the
officer's right to detain the motorist while performing a background check for outstanding
warrants and criminal history, and the officer's right to order the driver and passengers
out of the vehicle even in the absence of any particularized suspicion of personal danger.
Id. at 1221-22 (citing Unites States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528,1535 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996)
("[warrant] checks are run largely to protect the officer); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
408, 415 (1997) (officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle even without any
particularized suspicion of personal danger); and Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,111 (driver may
be ordered to exit the vehicle in the interest of officer safety)).4 Although these rights
4

The Tenth Circuit also listed "other situations in which federal courts have
allowed considerations of officer safety to outweigh fairly intrusive conduct during a
traffic stop." Holt, 264 F.3d at 1223 (citing Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44,
53 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (officers may order the passengers to remain in the vehicle); United
States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 981 (4th Cir. 1997) (officer may open the door of a
vehicle with darkly tinted windows to check for weapons); United States v. Moorefield,
111 F.3d 10, 13 (3rd Cir. 1997 (officers may order the occupants to raise their hands
during the stop); and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (officers may use a
11

have nothing to do with the original purpose for the stop, they are justified by the
government's strong interest in protecting its police officers. Id. Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that "the individual-privacy-interests side of the Fourth Amendment
balancing is weaker in this context, [and] the governmental-interests side is much
stronger." Id. at 1222. Thus, the Holt court held that an officer is justified in asking a
motorist if he or she possesses any loaded weapons, regardless of whether he has
reasonable suspicion to believe that the motorist is armed. Id. at 1226.
In support of its holding, the Holt court recognized that "'law enforcement
officials literally risk their lives each time they approach occupied vehicles during the
course of investigative traffic stops/" and cited the United States Supreme Court's
longstanding acknowledgment of the dangerous nature of traffic stops. Id. (citing
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978; and McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536 n. 6 (noting the "tragedy of the
many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year")). Specifically, in
1977, twenty-four years before Holt was decided, the Supreme Court "found it 'too plain
for argument' that the government's interest in officer safety is 'both legitimate and
weighty/ given the 'inordinate risks confronting an officer as he approaches a person
seated in an automobile.'" Id. (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110). In that year, the High
Court noted that t4[t]hirty percent of police shootings occurred when a police officer

flashlight to check the dark interior of a car) (plurality opinion)). Indeed, as the Holt
court noted, the intrusive nature of those practices is far greater than a mere question as to
possession of weapons. Id.

12

approached a suspect seated in an auto mobile, and 'a significant percentage of murders
of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops/" Id. at 1222-23
(citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (citations omitted)). Seventeen years after Mimms, the
Supreme Court recognized that 5,762 officer were assaulted and 11 were killed during
traffic pursuits and stops, in 1994 alone. Id. at 1222 (citing Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413).
Given those facts, the Tenth Circuit also observed that "the most recent data
reveals that in 1999, 6,048 officers were assaulted during traffic pursuits and stops and 8
were killed." Id. at 1223 (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports:
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 82, 28 (1999)). Further, the court offered
statistics revealing that "[m]ore than 34% of those assaults involved a dangerous weapon
such as a gun or knife[,]" and that "[f]irearms were used to commit 82 of the 94 killings
of law enforcement officers during traffic pursuits and stops during the 1990s." Id.
(citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement
Officers Killed and Assaulted 83-84,28 (1999)).
The Holt court summarized its morbid findings in two paragraphs.
The terrifying truth is that officers face a very real risk of being assaulted
with a dangerous weapon each time they stop a vehicle. The officer
typically has to leave his vehicle, thereby exposing himself to potential
assault by the motorist. The officer approaches the vehicle not knowing
who the motorist is or what the motorist's intentions might be. It is
precisely during such an exposed stop that the courts have been willing to
give the officers 'wide latitude,' Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978, to discern the
threat the motorist may pose to officer safety.
An officer in today's reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his
or her life every time a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is a
13

confrontation. The motorist must suspend his plans and anticipates
receiving a fine and perhaps even a jail term. That expectation becomes
even more real when the motorist or a passenger knows there are
outstanding arrest warrants or current criminal activity that may be
discovered during the course of the stop. Resort to a loaded weapon is an
increasingly plausible option for many such motorists to escape those
consequences, and the officer, when stopping a car on a routine traffic stop
never knows in advance which motorists have that option by virtue of
possession of a loaded weapon in the car.
#o//,264F.3datl223. 5
Next, citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Whren v. United States and New
York v. Quarles, the Holt court explained "that the balance does not depend on whether
the officer subjectively fears the motorist." Id. at 1225 (citing Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996) (Fourth Amendment analysis rarely includes subjective
intentions) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) ("[T]he availability of
[the public safety] exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual
officers involved).]"). Rather, the test is an objective one. Id. "That one officer is
braver (or more foolhardy) than another, and therefore not subjectively concerned for his

5

In response to the argument that a motorist in possession of a weapon is unlikely
to admit that fact, the Tenth Circuit noted that Holt's admission to possession of the
handgun tends to undercut that argument. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1223-24. Irrespective of that,
the Holt court recognized that a motorist's false denial may provide important clues to
officers trained to recognize suspicious and evasive behavior, concerning the motorist's
true intentions. Id. Similarly, important clues warranting prudent behavior may also be
gathered where a motorist declines to answer the officer's question. Id. Thus, the Holt
court concluded that "any response the officer receives in response to [a weapons]
question will be helpful in appraising the risk presented more accurately." However, the
Tenth Circuit also cautioned officers that they may not use the refusal to answer a
weapons question as the basis for a more intrusive search. Id.
14

or her safety, should not deprive that particular officer of arightto protect his or her
safety. Even the brave officer should be allowed to minimize the ever-present risk of
being attacked or killed." Id. at 1225-26.
Based on its through findings and analysis, the Tenth Circuit concluded "that the
government's interest in officer safety outweighs a motorist's interest in not being asked
about the presence of loaded weapons." Id. at 1226. Where the scales are so tilted in
favor of officer safety, the Tenth Circuit ruled that an officer's question is justified ueven
when the officer lacks particularized suspicion that the motorist possesses loaded
weapons and regardless of whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist." Id.
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Utah Supreme Court has followed federal courts in
recognizing that officer safety is an overriding concern in traffic stops. See State v.
James, 2000 UT 80, % 10,13 P.3d 576. Utah law enforcement is not immune from the
national trend. See, e.g., State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 fl2-5,994 P.2d 177 (passenger in
traffic stop shot at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his hands); State v.
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without warning as
officer approached vehicle). Given those concerns, Utah courts have also permitted
officers to take certain measures, at least in part, in the pursuit of officer safety. See
James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 ("Owing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of
the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the
course of the investigation.") (citing Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412-15 and Mimms, 434 U.S.
110-11); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Utah 1994) (officer may ask for a
15

driver's license and vehicle registration and may make an inquiry concerning the
suspicious conduct of the person detained); State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 280
(Utah App. 1992) (officer may run a computer check for any outstanding warrants); and
State v. O 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998) (officer's visual inspection of the
vehicle was necessary to ensure his safety). These and other articulated safety
precautions weigh in favor of allowing an officer to briefly ask whether a motorist
possesses any weapons.
Here, as in Holt, Officer Olsen's question as to whether defendant possessed any
weapons could hardly be intrusive.6 The question was asked immediately after Officer
Slaugh requested defendant's driver's license, and therefore was not even as remote in
time as the question posed to Holt while he was seated in the officer's patrol car. See R.
106:10; Holt, 264 F.3d 1218. When compared to a permissible warrants check and an
order to exit the vehicle, the officer's question was much more brief and less intrusive.
See James, 2000 UT 80, f10;and Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d at 280. Additionally, the
legitimate officer safety concerns related to traffic stops as recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the Tenth Circuit in Holt, weigh
heavily in favor of permitting the officer's question. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,23

Indeed, under many states' concealed weapons laws a motorist stopped by police
is obligated to notify the officer that the motorist is carrying a concealed weapon. See
Alaska Stat. § 18.65.750 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3112 (2000); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-73-315 (2001); La. Rev. Stat Ann. § 1379.3 (2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.11
(2002); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 1290.8 (2001); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.205 (2001).
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(1968) (^American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in
this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands
more are wounded .. .with guns and knifes . . . [c]ertainly it would be unreasonable to
require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. ").
Although the officer in Holt asked the defendant whether he possessed any "loaded
weapons," the officer here asked if defendant possessed any "weapons." This distinction,
however, is irrelevant under Utah law. Both a knife and gun are defined as dangerous
weapons under Utah's concealed dangerous weapons statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 7610-501 (Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp 2001); State v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920,929-30 (Utah App. 1991).
Because the State's immediate interest in officer safety heavily outweighs
defendant's interest in not being asked about the presence weapons, this Court should
adopt the rule articulated by the Tenth Circuit, and hold that an officer may briefly ask a
motorist if he or she possesses any weapons even when the officer lacks particularized
suspicion and regardless of whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist7

7

The State is not asserting that an officer may question a motorist about the
presence of drugs without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. See State v. Hansen,
2000 UT App. 353,1f 16,17 P.3d 1135.
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POINT II
NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
TENTH CIRCUIT'S RULING IN HOLT, UNDER A
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS,
THE OFFICERS' BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT WAS
POTENTIALLY ARMED WAS REASONABLE
The Fourth Amendment provides protection from "unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. It necessarily follows that '"what the Constitution
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but [only] unreasonable searches and seizures.'"
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(I960)). "Reasonableness, of course, depends on a balance between the public interest
and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers." Mimrns, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, no one factor is determinative in a reasonableness analysis; instead,
reasonableness is "measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the
circumstances." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
Defendant argues that Officer Olsen's question as to whether defendant possessed
any weapons was improper because the question went beyond the scope of the original
purpose for the traffic stop and was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Br. of Aplt. at
7-19. But defendant ignores the other circumstances surrounding the traffic stop. See id.
Thus, the question here is not whether the officers' knowledge of defendant's prior
concealed weapons charge was alone enough to establish a reasonable suspicion that
defendant was presently dangerous. Rather, the question in this case, where the validity
18

of the stop is unchallenged, is whether given a totality of the circumstances, including the
fact of defendant's prior concealed weapon charge, would make a reasonably careful
officer more concerned for his or her safety. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop indicates that the
officers' safety concerns were legitimate. At the onset of the encounter, Officer Slaugh's
knowledge of defendant's prior criminal charge for possession of contraband and a
concealed handgun raised a reasonable likelihood that defendant was presently armed and
dangerous. The prior encounter with police was recent, occurring only a month before
the instant stop, and was therefore vivid in the officer's mind. See R. 106:39-40. Indeed,
as a result of that encounter, Officer Slaugh testified that he considered defendant to be
"armed and dangerous." See R. 106:40. Accordingly, the officer's knowledge of
defendant's prior arrest was relevant to his suspicion that defendant was presently
dangerous. See State v. White, 856 P.2d 656,661 (Utah App. 1993) (although not
determinative, a previous police encounter may be relevant to a suspicion that a suspect
might be presently dangerous); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986) (Officers
may protect themselves and others when they "knowingly and willingly enter hostile
environs to confront dangerous persons"); United States v. Hughes, 15 F.3d 798, 802 (8th
Cir. 1994) (officer's prior knowledge of the defendant's tendency to carry a weapon
justified a subsequent search for weapons); State v. Collins, 847 P.2d 919,922-24 (Wash.
1993) (officer's memory of the defendant's prior felony together with two other factors
was enough to support reasonable suspicion for a safety frisk).
19

Additionally, while approaching defendant's vehicle, the officers were initially
surprised by a large and aggressive Rottweiler, barking and lunging at the officers from
the back of defendant's truck. See R. 87:83-84; 106:7. Fearing for their safety, the
officers immediately drew their service weapons and retreated toward the back of the
trailer. R. 87:83; 106:7-8. While the presence of the dog is not directly relevant to
whether defendant was armed, it certainly heightened the mounting tension surrounding
the stop and raised both parties' apprehensions. See R. 106:8 (upon hearing the dog bark,
defendant immediately exited his vehicle, shut the door, and stood beside it).
More importantly, however, defendant's suspicious behavior during the stop
provided the additional suspicion necessary to solidify the officer's safety concerns.
While defendant was standing beside his vehicle, Officer Slaugh yelled to him,
commanding him to meet him at the back of the trailer, away from the dog. See R. 106:89. Despite the officer's clear order, defendant got back into his truck and shut the door.
See id. Due to the darkness and the fact that the dog and the truck door were blocking the
officers' view, they were unable to see what defendant was doing inside the vehicle. See
R. 87:78; 106:8-9. Finally, after being commanded to exit the vehicle a second time,
defendant left his vehicle and approached the officers. SeeK. 106:9. However,
defendant's entire waist was concealed by an untucked shirt, thus further arousing the
officers' sense of danger. See R. 106:12, 15,43. State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185
(Utah App. 1996) (In determining the reasonableness of a given situation, "common
sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria") (quotations
20

omitted)). Moreover, this stop occurred at shortly after midnight; "an individual who has
been stopped may be more willing to commit violence against a police officer at a time
when few people are likely to be present to witness it." Collins, 847 P.2d at 922.
Given the knowledge of defendant's prior concealed weapons charge, and the
tension created by an encounter with defendant's aggressive dog, a reasonably careful
officer would have feared that defendant's disobedience was an attempt to arm himself by
concealing a weapon under his shirt. See United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179
(10th Cir. 2000) ("While knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement is not
sufficient itself to even rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, it can combine with other
factors to support the requisite standard of suspicion.''). 'These dangers are proper
considerations for a reasonably careful police officer forced to make a quick decision as
the appropriate course of action to take to preserve his or her safety and the safety of
others." Collins, 847 P.2d at 922. Thus, under a totality of the circumstances, where the
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was armed and dangerous,
Officer Olsen's question as to whether defendant possessed any weapons was justified.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 ("When an officer is justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicions behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or other, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take necessary measures to . . . neutralize the threat of physical
harm.").
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Dated this */ " day of October, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

WEAPONS
76-10-501. Definitions.
As used in this part
(1) (a) "Antiquefirearm"means any firearm*
(i) (A) with a matchlock,flintlock,percussion cap, or similar
type of ignition system; and
(B) that was manufactured in or before 1898; or
(ii) that is a replica of anyfirearmdescribed in this Subsection
(lXa), if the replica:
(A) is not designed or redesigned for using rimfire or
conventional centerfire fixed ammunition; or
(B) uses rimfire or centerfire fixed ammunition which is:
(I) no longer manufactured in the United States; and
(II) is not readily available in ordinary channels of
commercial trade; or
(iii) (A) that is a muzzle loading rifle, shotgun, or pistol; and
(B) is designed to use black powder, or a black powder
substitute, and cannot usefixedammunition,
(b) "Antiquefirearm"does not include:
(i) any weapon that incorporates afirearmframeor receiver,
(ii) any firearm that is converted into a muzzle loading
weapon; or
(iii) any muzzle loading weapon that can be readily converted
tofirefixedammunition by replacing the:
(A) barrel;
(B) bolt;
(C) breechblock; or
(D) any combination of Subsection UXbXiiiXA), (B), or (C).
(2) (a) Concealed dangerous weapon* means a dangerous weapon that
is covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not
be aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use.
(b) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a concealed dangerous weapon if it is afirearmwhich is unloaded and is securely
encased.
(3) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background
check conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where
thefirearmsdealer conducts business.
(4) "Curio or relicfirearm"means anyfirearmthat:
(a) is ofspecial interest to a collector because ofa quality that is not
associated withfirearmsintended for
(i) sporting use;
(ii) use as an offensive weapon; or
(iii) use as a defensive weapon;
(b) (i) was manufactured at least 50 years prior to the current
date; and
(ii) is not a replica ofafirearmdescribed in Subsection (4XbXi);
(c) is certified by the curator of a municipal, state, or federal
museum that exhibits firearms to be a curio or relic of museum
interest;
(d) derives a substantial part of its monetary value:
(i) from the fact that thefirearmis:
(A) novel;
(B) rare; or
(C) bizarre; or
(ii) because of thefirearm'sassociation with an historical:
(A) figure;
(B) period; or
(C) event; and
(e) has been designated as a curio or relicfirearmby the director of
the United States Treasury Department Bureau of Alcohol, Tbbacco,
and Firearms under 27 C PR Seo 17ft 11
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use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. The following factors shall be used in determining whether a
knife, or any other item, object, or thing not commonly known as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was
used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object,
or thing may be used,
(b) "Dangerous weapon* does not include any explosive, chemical,
or incendiary device as defined by Section 76-10-306.
(6) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under crimes and
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling,
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
(7) "Division* means the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section
53-10-103.
(8) "Enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(9) (a) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun,
rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous
weaponfromwhich is expelled a projectile by action of an explosive.
(b) As used in Sections 76-10-626 and 76-10-627, "firearm" does not
include an antique firearm.
(10) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form created by the
division to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a
handgunfroma dealer in the state.
(11) "Fully automatic weapon" means any firearm which fires, is designed tofire,or can be readily restored tofire,automatically more than
one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger.
(12) <a) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm of any
description, loaded or unloaded,fromwhich any shot, bullet, or other
missile can be discharged, the length of which, not including any
revolving, detachable, or magazine breech, does not exceed 12 inches.
(b) As used in Sections 76-10-620,76-10-521, and 76-10-622, "handgun" and "pistol or revolver" do not include an antique firearm.
(13) "House of worship" means a church, temple, synagogue, mosque, or
other building set apart primarily for the purpose of worship in which
religious services are held and the main body of which is kept for that use
and not put to any other use inconsistent with its primary purpose.
(14) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawfiil to discharge a firearm.
(15) "Readily accessible for immediate use* means that a firearm or
other dangerous weapon is carried on the person or within such close
proximity and in such a manner that it can be retrieved and used as
readily as if carried on the person.
(16) "Residence" means an improvement to real property used or
occupied as a primary or secondary residence.
(17) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-off rifle" means a shotgun having a
barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 indies in length, or in the case of a rifle,
•having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any
dangerous weapon madefroma rU|p or shotgun by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has an overall length of fewer
than 26 inches.
(18) "Securely encased" means not readily accessible for immediate use,
such as held in a gun rack, or in a closed case or container, whether or not
locked, or in a trunk or other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including
a glove box or console box.
(19) "State entity" means each department, commission, board, council,
agency, institution, officer, corporation, fund, division, office, committee,
authority, laboratory, library, unit, bureau, panel, or other administrative
unit of the state.
(20) "Violent felony" means the same as defined in Section 76-3-203.5.

76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon — Penalties.
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3):
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in
Section 76-10-501, which is not a firearm on his person or one that is
readily accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as
defined in this part, in a place other than his residence, property, or
business under his control is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; and
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if thefirearmcontains
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a sawed-off rifle
is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) If the concealedfirearmis used in the commission of a violent felony as
defined in Section 76-3-203.5, and the person is a party to the ofifense, the
person is guilty of a second degree felony.
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful
taking of protected or unprotected wildlife as defined in Title 23, Wildlife
Resources Code,firomcarrying a concealed weapon or a concealedfirearmwith
a barrel length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of wildlife does
not occur
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of that municipality's
ordinances; or
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 41-6-1.
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to suppress, Court of Appeals accepts the district
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Defendant was indicted for possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute,
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During routine traffic stop, officer may ask about
the driver's authority to operate the vehicle.
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consensual. U.S.CA. ConstAmend 4.
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traffic stop while the officer runs a background
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criminal history pertaining to the motorist, even
though the purpose of the stop had nothing to do
with such prior criminal history. US.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
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U S C A. ConstAmend. 4
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop
based on probable cause must be judged by
examining both the length of the detention and the
manner in which it is carried out. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
*1217 Richard A. Friedman, Appellate Section,
Criminal
Division,
Department
of Justice,
Washington, DC, (Bruce Green, United States
Attorney, and D. Michael Littlefield, Assistant
United States Attorney, with him on the brief) for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Michael A. Abel, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, (Stephen J. Knorr, Federal Public
Defender, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma,
for Defendant-Appellee.

Before TACHA, Chief Judge, and SEYMOUR,
BRORBY, EBEL, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE,
LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

ON REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM [FN*]
FN* Parts I and II of Judge Ebel's opinion
represent the en banc opinion of this court
with the exception of a caveat noted in
Judge Henry's concurrence. Parts I and II
of Judge Briscoe's opinion also represent
the en banc opinion of this court. Part EQ
of Judge Ebel's opinion represents only the
opinion of Chief Judge Tacha and Judges
Brorby, Ebel, and Kelly. Parts III and IV
of Judge Briscoe's opinion represent only
the opinion of Judges Seymour, Briscoe,
Lucero, and Murphy. Judge Henry has
filed a separate concurrence joining Parts I
and II of Judge Ebel's opinion with a
caveat and Parts I and II of Judge Briscoe's
opinion. Judge Kelly has filed a separate
opinion joining Judge Ebel's opinion.
Judge Lucero, joined by Judge Seymour,
has filed a separate opinion joining Judge
Briscoe's opinion. Judge Murphy has filed
a separate opinion joining Judge Briscoe's
opinion.

After a divided panel affirmed the district court's
suppression of evidence obtained during a search of
the defendant's car incident to a traffic stop, see
United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931 (10th Cir.2000)
, this court granted rehearing en banc on the
following questions: (1) whether the Fourth
Amendment constrains the scope, as well as the
duration, of a traffic stop, and (2) whether an officer
conducting a traffic stop may ask the driver about
the presence of weapons in the absence of
reasonable suspicion that the driver is armed and
dangerous. Consistent with the panel opinion, a
majority of this court concludes that the analytical
framework set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), applies to
traffic stops, and that Terry requires an analysis of
both the scope and duration of a stop to determine
whether the stop comports with the Fourth
Amendment. In contrast to the original panel
opinion, however, a majority of this court concludes
that an officer conducting a traffic stop may ask the
driver about the presence of loaded weapons in the
absence of particularized suspicion of the existence
of such firearms.
As a result, we VACATE the panel opinion,
REVERSE the district court's suppression orders
and REMAND the case to the district court for
further proceedings, consistent with Parts I and II of
Judge Ebel's opinion (subject to the caveat
contained in Judge Henry's concurrence) and Parts I
and II of Judge Briscoe's opinion.

EBEL, Circuit Judge. [FN**]
FN** Parts I and II of this opinion are
joined by Chief Judge Tacha and Judges
Brorby, Kelly and Henry (subject to a
caveat
noted
in
Judge
Henry's
concurrence). Thus, Parts I and II
represent the majority opinion of the en
banc court, subject to Judge Henry's caveat.
We granted en banc rehearing in this case to
delineate the scope of permissible questioning
during a routine traffic stop. We hold that the
officer's question about the existence of a loaded
weapon in the vehicle was justified on the grounds
of officer safety. During a routine traffic stop, an
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officer may ask the stopped motonst *1218 whether
there is a loaded firearm in the car even in the
absence of particularized suspicion of the existence
of such a firearm. The objective safety risks to
officers during routine traffic stops in general have
led courts to approve reasonable steps to insure
officer safety, including asking the driver and
passengers of a stopped car to exit the vehicle and
conducting routine cnminal history checks. These
safety risks also justify limited questions about the
presence of loaded weapons. Thus, we reverse the
suppression of the answer given as to the presence
of a loaded weapon in the vehicle and remand for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND [FN1]

FN1. Many of the details of this traffic
stop are sel forth in the original panel
opinion, United States v Holt, ll<} F.3d
931 (10th Cu\2000).

On the evening of September 15, 1999, officers
from the Muldrow, Oklahoma police department,
accompanied by Damon Tucker, an Oklahoma
Highway Patrol officer, established a driver's
license checkpoint on Treat Road within the city
limits of Muldrow The admitted impetus for
establishing a checkpoint at this location was the
officers' suspicion that the defendant, Dennis Holt,
who lived in the area, was transporting illegal drugs
along Treat Road. [FN2]
FN2 Holt did not fully challenge the
legality of the checkpoint below. We
merely note, without drawing any
conclusions, that City of Indianapolis v
Edmond. 531 US. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148
LEd.2d 333 (2000), was decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States after
the district: court ruling in this case.
Although Holt asserts an Edmond
challenge m his Supplemental Bnef, we do
not believe the factual record is sufficiently
developed to reach the issue. The parties
remain free to address Edmond on remand.

At the checkpoint, the officers stopped all vehicles
Copr © West 2002 No Claim

traveling along Treat Road and checked all drivers1
licenses. At approximately 10*30 pm., Tucker
observed a Ford Ranger truck approach the
checkpoint. Tucker noted that die driver of the
truck, defendant Holt, was not wearing a seatbelt.
After asking to see Holt's driver's license, Tucker
asked Holt why he was not wearing a seatbelt. Holt
stated that he lived in the area and pointed toward
his house. At some point thereafter, officers from
the Muldrow police department informed Tucker
that Holt was the person they were seeking. Tucker
asked Holt to pull over to the side of die road, exit
his vehicle, and join Tucker m his patrol car.
After Holt got mto the patrol car, Tucker asked for
Holt's driver's license and proceeded to write a
warning for the seatbelt violation. While doing so,
Tucker asked Holt if "there was anything in [Holt's]
vehicle [that Tucker] should know about such as
loaded weapons." According to Tucker, he asks
that question "on a lot of [his] stops." Holt stated
there was a loaded pistol behind the passenger seat
of his vehicle. Holt did not indicate whether he had
a permit to carry a loaded gun (Oklahoma law
requires a person carrying a permitted weapon
immediately to disclose that fact when stopped by
an officer), and Tucker did not ask whether Holt
possessed such a permit Tucker then asked Holt if
"there was anything else that [Tucker] should know
about in the vehicle." Holt stated, "I know what
you are referring to" but "I don't use them
anymore." Upon further questioning by Tucker,
Holt indicated that he had previously used drugs,
but "hadn't been involved with them in about a year
or so." At that point, Tucker asked Holt for consent
to search his vehicle. Holt agreed. The district
court found that Tucker had not yet issued the
warning to Holt for the seatbelt violation at that
point, and it is *1219 undisputed that Tucker still
had Holt's driver's license in his possession during
all the above-outlined questioning. According to
Tucker, approximately three to four minutes elapsed
between the tune he and Holt got into the patrol car
and the time Holt consented to the search of his
vehicle.
Tucker and Holt then got out of the patrol car and
Tucker again asked Holt if diere was anything else
in the vehicle. Holt responded that the gun was all
Tucker would find. Tucker proceeded to search the
cab of the truck and found a loaded pistol behind
the passenger seat. One of the Muldrow police
Ong U S Govt. Works
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officers, when informed by Tucker that Holt had
given consent to have his vehicle searched, began
looking through the camper shell on the back of the
truck. During the course of his search, this officer
found a small bag containing spoons, syringes,
loose matches, and two small baggies of a white
powdery substance. Based upon the discovery of
this evidence, Tucker arrested Holt and transported
him to the Muldrow jail.
Shortly after Holt's arrest, Tucker contacted an
assistant district attorney for Sequoyah County
regarding the possibility of obtaining a search
warrant for Holfs residence based upon the
evidence recovered from Holt's vehicle. The
assistant district attorney concluded the evidence
was not sufficient to support a search warrant for
Holt's residence. He did, however, advise Tucker to
utilize "a knock and talk" technique. In accordance
with this advice, police officers went to Holfs
residence, and Holt's mother gave verbal consent to
search the premises. During the search, officers
found chemical glassware in a room where Holt
stayed, as well as drugs and various drug-making
equipment m an outbuilding.
Holt was indicted on October 14, 1999, on two
counts of possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
, one count of manufacturing methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and one count of
possession of a firearm in connection with a drug
trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
. Holt moved to suppress his responses to Tucker's
questions and the evidence seized from his vehicle.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on
the motion at which both Tucker and Holt testified.
The district court subsequently issued a written
order granting the motion to suppress. Shortly
thereafter, Holt filed a supplemental motion to
suppress the evidence seized from his residence.
That motion was granted by the district court
pursuant to the government's concession that
evidence obtained from the house should be
suppressed if evidence obtained from the car was
suppressed. [FN3] The government now brings an
interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of
the loaded gun, the drug paraphernalia found in the
car and at the residence, andHolt's statements
acknowledging his possession of a loaded gun and
his prior drug use.

FN3. Because the search of the house was
predicated on consent by Holt's mother, it
is not apparent from the record before us
why the evidence obtained from the search
necessarily had to be suppressed if the
evidence obtained from the search of the
car was suppressed. However, for the
purpose of this appeal we accept the
government's concession in that regard. If
appropriate, this matter can be explored
upon remand.

DISCUSSION
[1][2] In reviewing a district court order granting a
motion to suppress, we accept the district court's
factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to
those findings. United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d
1240, 1243 (10th Cir.2001). We review *1220 de
novo the ultimate determination of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness. Id.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
[3][4] The Fourth Amendment protects individuals
from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
Const, amend. IV. "A traffic stop is a 'seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief." United States v.
Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998)
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653,
99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always the reasonableness in all
the circumstances of the particular invasion of a
citizen's personal security. Reasonableness, of
course, depends on a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98
S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam)
(quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946,
950, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) ("[W]e balance the
privacy-related
and
law
enforcement-related
concerns to determine if the intrusion was
reasonable."); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,
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116, 106 SCt. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986)
(balancing "the need to search or seize against the
invasion which the search or seizure entails"
(brackets omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U S at 21,
88 S.Ct. 1868)) We generally disfavor bright-line
rules in the Fourth Amendment context, relying
instead on this basic balancing test. See Ohio v
Robmette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136
L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); United States v Broomfield,
201 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir2000), cert, denied,
531 U S 830, 121 S Ct. 82, 148 L.Ed.2d 44 (2000).
No one factor is determinative in this analysis;
instead, reasonableness is "measured in objective
terms by examining the totality of the
circumstances" Robmette, 519 U S . at 39, 117
S.Ct. 417 In considering the indmdual-nghts side
of the balance, we consider the individual's
reasonable expectations of pnvacy and liberty. See
Romo v Champion, 46 F3d 1013, 1018 (10th
Cir.1995); United States v Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058,
1063
(10th
Or 1993);
United States v
Mesa-Rmcon, 911 F i d 1433,1442(10thCir. 1990).
[5] We have consistently applied the principles of
Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20
LEA2d 889 (1968), to routine traffic stops. See,
eg, United States v Botero-Osptna, 71 F3d 783,
788 (10th Or. 1995) (en banc). Under Terry, the
reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on
"whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place." 392 U.S. at 20, 88
S Ct 1868 Thus, we assess the reasonableness of a
traffic stop based on an observed violation by
considering the scope of the officer's actions and
balancing the motorist's legitimate expectation of
pnvacy against the government's law-enforcementrelated interests.
For example, when stopped for a traffic violation, a
motonst expects "to spend a short period of time
answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration." Berkemer v
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S.Ct 3138, 82
LEd2d 317 (1984). At the same time, the
government has a strong interest in ensuring that
motorists comply with traffic laws. See Whren v.
United States 517 US. 806, 818, 116 SCt. 1769,
135 LEd.2d 89 (1996) (noting the "usual rule that
probable cause to believe the law has been M221
broken 'outbalances' private interest in avoiding

police contact"). Thus, it is beyond dispute that an
officer may ask questions relating to the reason for
the stop. Ordinarily, this also includes questions
relating to the motorist's travel plans. See, eg,
United States v. West, 219 F3d 1171, 1176 (10th
Cir.2000); United States v Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261,
1263 (10th Cir.1989); United States v Hill, 195
F 3d 258, 268 (6th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S.
1176, 120 S.Ct. 1207, 145 L.Ed.2d 1110 (2000);
United States v $404,905 00, 182 F 3d 643, 647
(8th Cir. 1999). Travel plans typically are related to
the purpose of a traffic stop because the motonst is
traveling at the time of the stop. For example, a
motorist's travel history and travel plans may help
explain, or put mto context, why the motonst was
weaving (if tired) or speeding (if there was an
urgency to the travel). See, eg, United States v
Barahona, 990 F.2d 412,416 (8th Cir. 1993).
[6] It is also well established that an officer may ask
about the dnver's authonty to operate the vehicle.
Thus, we have repeatedly stated that during a
routine traffic stop the officer may ask to see a
dnver's license and registration and check that they
are vahd. See, e.g, United States v Caro, 248 F.3d
1240,1244 (10th Cir .2001).
[7][8] On the other hand, motorists ordinarily
expect to be allowed to continue on their way once
the purposes of a stop are met See Berkemer, 468
U S . at 437, 104 S.Ct 3138. The government's
general interest in criminal investigation, without
more, is generally insufficient to outweigh the
individual interest in ending the detention Thus,
once the motorist has "produced a valid license and
proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must
be allowed to proceed on his way, without being
subject to further delay by police for additional
questioning." United States v Guzman, 864 F2d
1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988), overruled on other
grounds by Botero-Ospima, 71 F 3d at 785 Further
delay is justified only if the officer has reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity or if the encounter has
become consensual. Hunmcutt, 135 F 3d at 1349.
II. QUESTIONS ABOUT LOADED WEAPONS
[9] As with questions about the observed violation
and the dnver's authonty to operate the vehicle, a
motonst expects an officer to take reasonable
measures to protect officer safety dunng the stop
When these measures are not too intrusive, the

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U S. Govt Works

264 F.3d 1215
2001 D J C A R 4452
(Cite as: 264 F.3d 1215)

Page 7

government's strong interest in officer safety
outweighs the motorist's interests. Thus, for
example, the motorist may be detained for a short
period while the officer runs a background check to
see if there are any outstanding warrants or criminal
history pertaining to the motorist even though the
purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such
prior criminal history. The justification for
detaining a motorist to obtain a criminal history
check is, in part, officer safety. See, e.g., United
States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1535 n. 6 (10th
Cir.1996) ("Triple I checks are run largely to
protect the officer. Considering the tragedy of the
many officers who are shot during routine traffic
stops ..., the almost simultaneous computer check of
a person's criminal record ... is reasonable and
hardly intrusive."); United States v. Purcell, 236
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.2001) ("The request for
criminal histories as part of a routine computer
check is justified for officer safety."); United States
v. Finite. 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir.1996) ("The
results of a criminal history check could indicate
whether further back-up or other safety precautions
were necessary."). By determining whether a
detained motorist has a criminal record or *1222
outstanding warrants, an officer will be better
apprized of whether the detained motorist might
engage in violent activity during the stop.

when the person first comes into contact with any
law enforcement officer ... during the course of
any ... routine traffic stop.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1290.8(C). Holt testified
at the suppression hearing that he did not have a
concealed-handgun permit. Thus, he was not under
this statutory obligation to volunteer the presence of
the gun when he was stopped. The above-quoted
statute nevertheless remains relevant to determining
reasonable expectations of privacy in Oklahoma.
Oklahomans who lawfully possess concealed
weapons have no expectation of privacy that society
would recognize as reasonable in the fact that they
are carrying concealed weapons, because they are
required by law to disclose that fact. It would make
little sense for Oklahoma society nevertheless to
recognize as reasonable the privacy expectations of
those who illegally possess concealed weapons in
not revealing that information. Holt therefore had
no reasonable expectation (that is, no expectation
that Oklahoma society would recognize as
reasonable) of keeping private the fact he was
carrying a loaded weapon behind the passenger seat
of his vehicle. Cf. United States v. Villa-Chaparro,
115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir.1997) (a driver has no
expectation of privacy in the Vehicle Identification
Number due to the federal requirement that it be
located in plain view).

[10][11] An officer also may order the driver and
passengers out of the vehicle in the interest of
officer safety, even in the absence of any
particularized suspicion of personal danger.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct.
882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct 330, 54
L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). While a motorist retains some
reasonable expectation of privacy when officer
safety is at stake, cf Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113, 117, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998)
(rejecting the argument that officer safety justifies a
full fie Id-type search during a routine traffic stop),
the motorist's expectations
are necessarily
diminished.

While the individual-privacy-interests side of the
Fourth Amendment balancing is weaker in this
context, the governmental-interests side is much
stronger. The Supreme Court has found it "too
plain for argument" that the government's interest in
officer safety is "both legitimate and weighty,"
given the "inordinate risks confronting an officer as
he approaches a person seated in an automobile."
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330. Other
courts have also recognized that "[l]aw enforcement
officials literally risk their lives each time they
approach occupied vehicles during the course of
investigative traffic stops." United States v.
Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 978 (4th Cir.1997); see
also McRae, 81 F.3d at 1536 n. 6 (noting the
"tragedy of the many officers who are shot during
routine traffic stops each year").

[12] In this case, Holt's reasonable expectations of
pnvacy are even lower with respect to his concealed
weapon. Under Oklahoma law, it is
unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to
identify the fact that the person is in actual
possession of a concealed handgun pursuant to
the authority of the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act
Copr. © West 2002 No <
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In Maryland v. Wilson the Supreme Court noted
that in 1994 alone, 5,762 officers were assaulted
and 11 were killed during traffic pursuits and stops.
519 U.S. at 413, 117 S.Ct. 882 (citing Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports:
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Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 71,
33 (1994)). Thirty percent M223 of police
shootings occurred when a police officer
approached a suspect seated in an automobile, and "
'a significant percentage of murders of police
officers occurs when die officers are making traffic
stops.' " Mmms. 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330 (
quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
234, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). The
most recent data reveal that in 1999, 6,048 officers
were assaulted during traffic pursuits and stops and
8 were killed. See Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers
Killed and Assaulted 82, 28 (1999). More than
34% of those assaults involved a dangerous weapon
such as a gun or knife. Id. at 83. Firearms were
used to commit 82 of the 94 killings of law
enforcement officers during traffic pursuits and
stops during the 1990s. Id. at 34.
The terrifying truth is that officers face a very real
risk of being assaulted with a dangerous weapon
each time they stop a vehicle. The officer typically
has to leave his vehicle, thereby exposing himself to
potential assault by the motorist The officer
approaches the vehicle not knowing who the
motorist is or what the motorist's intentions might
be. It is precisely during such an exposed stop that
the courts have been willing to give the officers
"wide latitude," Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978, to
discern the threat the motorist may pose to officer
safety.

have allowed considerations of officer safety to
outweigh fairly intrusive conduct during a traffic
stop. Thus, during a routine traffic stop, an officer
may order the driver and passengers out of the
vehicle, Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330;
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415, 117 S.Ct. 882; order the
passengers to remain in the vehicle, Rogala v.
District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 53
(D.C.Cir.1998); open the door of a vehicle with
darkly tinted windows to check for weapons,
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 981; order the occupants to
raise their hands during the stop, United States v.
Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 13 (3d Cir.1997); and use
a flashlight to check the dark interior of a car, Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75
L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion).
In addition to information about loaded weapons
that die officer may obtain from visually looking in
the car, shining a light around the interior of the car,
or asking the motorist and occupants to step out of
die car or to keep their hands raised-all procedures
authorized by the courts in the name of officer
safety-an officer may also obtain information about
the existence of a loaded weapon by simply asking
the motorist if there is a loaded weapon in the
vehicle. Indeed, straightforwardly asking this
question is often less intrusive than many of the
procedures authorized by our sister circuits.

An officer in today's reality has an objective,
reasonable basis to fear for his or her life every time
a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is
a confrontation. The motorist must suspend his or
her plans and anticipates receiving a fine and
perhaps even a jail term. That expectation becomes
even more real when the motorist or a passenger
knows there are outstanding arrest warrants or
current criminal activity that may be discovered
during the course of the stop. Resort to a loaded
weapon is an increasingly plausible option for many
such motorists to escape those consequences, and
the officer, when stopping a car on a routine traffic
stop, never knows in advance which motorists have
that option by virtue of possession of a loaded
weapon in the car.

If a motorist volunteers that there is a loaded
weapon in the car, that will undeniably *1224 be an
important piece of information causing the officer
to proceed with greater caution. It was suggested
during oral argument in the en banc rehearing that a
motorist with a loaded gun is unlikely to admit that
fact. The facts of this case somewhat belie that
argument Here, when asked that question, Holt
freely admitted the presence of a loaded gun. Other
cases present similar situations in which defendants
either volunteered or trothfully responded that they
possessed weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Cain,
155 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.1998); United States v.
Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.1998);
United States v. Maza, 93 F.3d 1390, 1395 (8th
Cir.1996); United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d
325, 326 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc); Burris v. State,
330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209, 211 (1997); State v.
Hill, 254 Neb. 460, 577 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1998).

In balancing the interests in this case, we are
guided by other situations in which federal courts

Even in those cases where the motorist falsely
denies the presence of a loaded gun, allowing the
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officer to ask the question may provide important
clues pertaining to safety. Officers have become
skilled at detecting nervous or evasive responses
from which the officer may gain valuable clues
about a motorist's intentions. Thus, even a denial
may alert the officer that the denial may not be
truthful and thus that the officer should take greater
care.
A third possibility is that the motorist may decline
to answer the question. That, too, conveys
information relevant to the officer's personal safety.
Although nothing compels the motorist to answer
such a question, when a motorist declines to answer
it, the officer may draw clues from that declination
that he or she should be more prudent and
concerned about personal safety. The officer may
not use the refusal to answer as the basis for a more
intrusive search, but the officer would certainly be
pennitted to use that information to justify prudent
safety-related measures.
Thus, any response the officer receives in response
to this question will be helpful in appraising the risk
presented more accurately. We therefore conclude
that allowing officers to ask about the presence of
loaded weapons in a lawfully stopped vehicle will
promote die government's "legitimate and weighty"
interest in officer safety.
If a motorist offers a voluntary response to a
question regarding the presence of a loaded gun, the
response could be used just like any other voluntary
admission made during a traffic stop. If the
admission reveals a crime the officer can act
accordingly, as is always the case when the officer
is aware of a crime taking place. If the motorist
declines to answer the question, however, the
officer could not, in the absence of particularized
suspicion, take any legal action (other than
reasonable actions for personal safety) based on that
refusal. Because it is within a motorist's right to
refuse to answer, ordinarily no inference of guilt
can be drawn from that refusal and any further
detention must be supported by reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Cf. Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138 C[T]he detainee is
not obligated to respond. And, unless the detainee's
answers provide the officer with probable cause to
arrest him, he must then be released." (footnotes
omitted)); Terry, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868
(White, J., concurring) ("Of course, the person
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim
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stopped is not obligated to answer, answers may not
be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no
basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer
to the need for continued observation.").
Although Holt was not in his vehicle when Officer
Tucker asked about loaded weapons, this does not
eviscerate the safety rationale for the question. By
ordering *1225 Holt to sit in the patrol car during
the stop, Tucker had temporarily neutralized the
risk posed by a weapon in Holt's vehicle. But with
the stop nearing completion, Officer Tucker
reasonably expected that Holt was about to return to
his vehicle and once again would have access to any
weapons in it It was at this point that Tucker asked
about loaded weapons in the vehicle, and the safety
rationale is plain. The Supreme Court has held that
the entire interior of a vehicle is treated as within a
motorist's immediate control and therefore falls
within the scope of a search incident to arrest, even
after the motorist has been ordered out of the
vehicle and placed under arrest. New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768
(1981). A search incident to arrest is justified in
part on the basis of officer safety. Id. at 457, 101
S.Ct. 2860. If die interior of the vehicle is relevant
to officer safety in a case like Belton, where the
arrestee is unlikely to return to the vehicle, then it is
all the more so relevant here, where the motorist is
almost certain to return.
[13] We emphasize also that the balance does not
depend on whether the officer subjectively fears the
motorist [FN4] Subjective intentions rarely play a
role in Fourth Amendment analysis. See Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13, 116 S.Ct.
1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). In the context of
officer safety in particular, die Supreme Court has
relied on an objective view of the circumstances.
See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117
S.Ct 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (holding that
objective circumstances during a traffic stop allow
an officer to order a driver out of the car,
"subjective thoughts notwithstanding"). Similarly,
the availability of a "search incident to arrest" for
officer safety does not depend on the subjective
mindset of the arresting officer. United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 & n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 467,
38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). As the Supreme Court has
explained in the context of the "public safety"
exception to Miranda warnings,
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FN4. Holt cites Officer Tucker's testimony
that he "d[id]n't remember feeling
threatened" by Holt. We believe this
statement may have been taken out of
context. Tucker was discussing whether he
had made a show of authority (e.g.,
touching his gun) while Holt was seated in
the patrol car. Tucker said he did not
because he had no reason to fear Holt at
that time. Thus, Tucker's statement does
not address whether he feared danger when
Holt returned to his car, which is the
relevant question, as noted above. The
record is silent on the subjective fear
question in the context of Holf s return to
his own car, but in any event, the
subjective question is not controlling.
[T]he availability of [the public-safety] exception
does not depend upon the motivation of the
individual officers involved.... [It] should not be
made to depend on post hoc findings at a
suppression hearing concerning the subjective
motivation
of
the
arresting
officers.
Undoubtedly, most police officers ... would act
out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely
unverifiable motives—their own safety, the safety
of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain
incriminating evidence from the suspect.
Whatever the motivation of individual officers in
such a position, we do not believe the doctrinal
underpinnings of Miranda require that it be
applied in all its rigor to a situation in which
police officers ask questions reasonably prompted
by a concern for the public safety.
New York v. Quarks, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56, 104
S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (footnote
omitted). That one officer is braver (or more
foolhardy) than another, and therefore not
subjectively concerned for his or her safety, should
not deprive that particular officer of a right to
protect his *1226 or her safety. Even the brave
officer should be allowed to minimize the
ever-present risk of being attacked or killed.
Given the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, we
hold that the government's interest in officer safety
outweighs a motorist's interest in not being asked
about the presence of loaded weapons. [FN5] This
balance tips in the government's favor even when
the officer lacks particularized suspicion that the
motonst possesses loaded weapons and regardless

of whether the officer subjectively fears the
motorist. Accordingly, the district court erred in
suppressing Holt's response to this question.

FN5. This case involves only a simple
question about the presence of a loaded
gun in a vehicle during a routine traffic
stop. We do not in this case attempt to
address other situations where the balance
might come out differently. Of course, any
questioning that unreasonably extends the
duration of the stop must be justified by
additional
articulable
suspicion
or
probable cause.

There are surprisingly few cases addressing this
question in other jurisdictions, but the several
federal circuit cases confronting this issue seem
generally to support our conclusion. See, e.g.,
Maza, 93 F.3d at 1396- 97 (finding "nothing
improper'* in an officer's questioning whether there
were guns in a truck, although without any
discussion of the constitutional issues); United
States v. Afoy, No. 98-3113, 1999 WL 1215651, at
*3
(D.C.Cir.
Nov.8,
1999)- (unpublished)
("Certainly ... the Fourth Amendment ... permits an
officer to ask simply whether a driver has a gun."),
cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1011, 120 S.Ct. 1284, 146
L.Ed.2d 231 (2000). [FN6]

FN6. In United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d
1034, 1039 (10th Cir.1996), we found an
officer's question about firearms during a
routine traffic stop was "unrelated to his
underlying justification for the detention."
That case did not address an officer-safety
justification for the question; however, to
the extent Lew or any of our other
precedent conflict with the rule we
announce today, we expressly overrule
them.

III. QUESTIONS NOT RELATED TO OFFICER
SAFETY [¥W]

FN7. This Part III represents only the
views of Chief Judge Tacha and Judges
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Brorby, Ebel, and Kelly.

have approved, and therefore might also be justified
on the grounds of officer safety. In context,
however, it might be seen as fishing for information
about Holt's unrelated drug activity, which likely
had no reasonable relationship to officer safety.
Second, assuming that Holt raised the drug issue
himself, it is unclear whether his response created a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would
itself justify further detention and questioning.
Third, the record does not resolve clearly whether
the subsequent questioning lengthened the stop or
whether all of it took place while Officer Tucker
was preparing the warning. Finally, we cannot tell
whether the questions about drugs, which did not
prompt any incriminatory responses, had any effect
on the subsequent course of action-in particular,
whether they affected the requests for consent to
search the vehicle and later the house.

Officer Tucker's first question to Holt was whether
there was anything in the vehicle Tucker should
know about, such as loaded weapons. As explained
above, this question was justified by considerations
of officer safety. The district court therefore erred
in suppressing Holfs response to this question. The
district court also suppressed Holt's responses to the
subsequent questioning and the evidence seized
during the searches of the vehicle and later the
house, and the officer-safety rationale does not
necessarily extend to these other matters.
The government has asked for a broader rule that
during a routine traffic stop, the officer may ask any
questions so long as they do not lengthen the stop or
transform it into a full custodial arrest. Cf. United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993)
("[Detention, not questioning, is the evil at which
Terry *s second prong is aimed."). Under this rule,
the government argues, all of Officer Tucker's
questioning was appropriate and the suppression
orders should be reversed in their entireties.
Because the factual record is not sufficiently
developed at present, however, I would decline to
address this issue. I would find it more prudent to
vacate the portions of the panel opinion in this case
discussing the issue and to leave its resolution in
this case for a later time after it is more fully
developed factually.

Given these uncertainties, I believe we could
address the government's broader argument only as
an abstract matter. We likely would not need to
address the issue at all if, for example, Officer
Tucker had reasonable suspicion to support his
questions. See Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1349. It
might also be unnecessary if Holfs consent to
search the vehicle was untainted by any Fourth
Amendment violation from the drug questions. See
United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th
Cir.1991). Rather than speculate about the
constitutionality of further questioning in the
abstract, I would remand to the district court to
develop an adequate factual record. That court
would also be able to rule on any remaining Fourth
Amendment issues in the first instance. I would
resolve the broader issues when they are framed
appropriately and it is necessary to do so, whether
in a later appeal in this case or in a more
appropriate case. No. 99-7150, United States v.
Holt

According to Officer Tucker's testimony at the
suppression hearing, the following *1227 took
place after Holt admitted he had a loaded weapon in
his vehicle. Tucker asked if there was anything else
he should know about in the vehicle, and Holt
mentioned that he did not use drugs anymore.
Tucker then questioned Holt further about his drug
history and habits and finally asked for consent to
search, which Holt gave. The total conversation
was no more than three to four minutes.

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge: [FNI]

There are a number of unresolved issues that might
affect our analysis of this questioning. First, it is
somewhat unclear whether Officer Tucker raised
the issue of drugs or whether Holt broached the
topic on his own. Tucker's second question—if there
was anything else he should know about in the
vehicle- appears on its face to be an appropriate
follow-up question to the one about weapons we
Copr. © West 2002 No <
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opinion represent the en banc opinion of
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We continue to adhere to the conclusions reached
in the original panel opinion. First, we reject the
government's primary en banc argument and
conclude that both the length and scope of a traffic
stop are relevant factors in deciding whether the
stop comports with the Fourth Amendment.
Second, we reject the government's request to adopt
a bright-line rule allowing an officer conducting a
traffic stop to ask a driver about the presence of
loaded weapons in the absence of reasonable
suspicion that the driver may be armed and
dangerous. We would reverse the suppression order
of the district court and remand with directions to
the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether defendant *1228 Holfs consent
to search his vehicle was tainted by the officer's
improper questioning about weapons.
I.
In reviewing an order granting a motion to
suppress, we accept the district court's factual
findings unless clearly erroneous, review questions
of law de novo, and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party. See United
States v. liland, 2:54 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th
Cir.2001); United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 1240,
1243 (10th Cir.2001).

n.
[14] The Fourth Amendment protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S.
Const, amend. IV. "A traffic stop is a 'seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 'even
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief.' " United States v.
Hunmcutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998)
(quoting Delaware v Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653,
99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). Because a
routine traffic stop is more analogous to an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest, we
have routinely analyzed such stops under the
framework announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). E.g.,
Hunmcutt, 135 F.3d at 1348. Under Terry, we
determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure
by conducting a "dual inquiry, asking first 'whether
the officer's action was justified at its inception,' and
second 'whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.' " Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at

20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The first prong of Terry is
clearly satisfied in this case because there is no
dispute that Tucker saw Holt driving without a
seatbelt. Thus, our focus is on the second prong of
the Terry inquiry, i.e., whether Tucker's questioning
of Holt regarding the presence of weapons in his
vehicle was reasonable. [FN2]
FN2. We note at the outset that Holt was
never asked any questions regarding his
travel plans. Therefore, we do not address
whether questions regarding travel plans
are "reasonably related" to the scope of
this or any stop.
Citing a line of cases from other courts, most
notably United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th
Cir.1993), the government argues that during a
traffic stop based on probable cause, length is the
only constraint on questioning. The government
argues that, as long as the officer's interrogation
does not unreasonably extend the length of the stop,
the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. In short,
the government asks us to abandon the "scope"
limitations of Terry and look only to the duration of
the stop. In the government's view, the nature of the
questions asked is immaterial to the Fourth
Amendment, at least as long as it does not change
the "fundamental character" of the seizure from a
Terry stop to a full custodial arrest. [FN3]

FN3. If the government were to retain any
viability to the "scope" limitation of Terry
it would only be in the ill-defined sense
that the questioning could not become so
intrusive as to change the fundamental
character of the stop.
In Shabazz, police officers stopped a vehicle for
speeding. One officer asked die driver to get out of
the vehicle and produce his driver's license. While
the officer ran a computer check on the license, he
asked the driver a series of questions about his
recent whereabouts. During the same time period, a
second officer posed similar questions to the
driver's companion, who remained in the vehicle.
After comparing notes and determining *1229 they
had been given conflicting stones, the officers
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sought and received consent to search the vehicle.
Drugs were found inside the vehicle and both the
driver and the occupant were charged and convicted
on drug-related counts. On appeal, they argued that
the officers exceeded the reasonable scope of the
original purpose of die stop when they questioned
them about their recent whereabouts. The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument. In doing so, the
court "rejected] any notion that a police officer's
questioning, even on a subject unrelated to the
purpose of the stop, is itself a Fourth Amendment
violation." 993 F.2d at 436. Further, the court
noted that the questioning at issue "occurred while
the officers were waiting for the results of the
computer check" and thus "did nothing to extend
the duration of the initial, valid seizure." Id. at 437.
In sum, the Fifth Circuit effectively held that
questioning by an officer, even on matters unrelated
to the purpose of the detention itself, docs not cause
a detention to become more intrusive unless the
questioning extends the duration of the detention.
We find the holding in Shabazz unpersuasive.
[FN4] In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's statement in
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct.
2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), that "mere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure." The
problem with this statement is that it was made by
the Court in the course of determining whether
random questioning of bus passengers by police
constituted a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment (the Court ultimately determined such
encounters are consensual and thus are not
"seizures"). The Court did not address the issue
posed in Shabazz and this case, i.e., whether, in the
context
of
a nonconsensual
police-citizen
encounter, police questioning on matters unrelated
to the purposes of the initial stop can be so intrusive
as to violate the Fourth Amendment. [FN5]
Although the Court has not directly addressed the
issue we now face, it has, in applying the Terry
analysis, routinely employed language indicating
there are limitations on both the length of the
detention and the manner in which it is carried out
(what I refer to here as the "scope" or "breadth" of
the detention). For example, in Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229
(1983), the Court emphasized that "the investigative
methods employed should be the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer's suspicion in a short period of time." The
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim

Court further emphasized it was the government's
burden to demonstrate that an investigative
detention "was sufficiently limited in scope and
duration." Id. (emphasis added); see also Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950, 148
L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) ("[T]he restraint at issue was
tailored to that need, being limited in time and
scope.") (emphasis added); United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 690, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605
(1985) *1230 ("Even a stop that lasts no longer than
necessary to complete the investigation for which
the stop was made may amount to an illegal arrest if
the stop is more than 'minimally intrusive.' ")
(Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed2d 604
(1985) (emphasizing that both the "length and
intrusiveness" of a stop are relevant for purposes of
the Terry analysis).

FN4. The Seventh Circuit recently rejected
Shabazz as weU, characterizing it as the
only
circuit
decision
refusing
to
acknowledge that "when a police officer
questions someone during a routine traffic
stop, inquiries falling outside the scope of
the detention constitute unlawful seizure."
United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564
andn.l(7thCir.2001).

FN5. Because Tucker had possession of
Holfs driver's license, the questioning
clearly occurred during a nonconsensual
encounter between Tucker and Holt. See
United States v. Mendezt 118 F.3d 1426,
1430 (10th Cir.1997) ("[T]his circuit has
consistently applied at least one brightline rule [in determining whether an officer
and driver are engaged in a consensual
encounter]: an officer must return a
driver's
documentation
before
the
detention can end.").
[15][16] We recognize that the Supreme Court has
suggested in dictum that traffic stops based on
probable cause might not be governed by Terry. See
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104
S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ("We of course
do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by
probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry
stop."). We nonetheless reject the government's
position and would adhere to our settled rule that a
traffic stop should be analyzed under Terry,
regardless of whether the stop is based on probable
cause or on some lesser suspicion. Factually, most
traffic stops are based on probable cause. Cf.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116
S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("As a general
matter, the decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable where the police have probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred.").
Rarely do these stops lead to an arrest, however,
even when arrest is authorized by statute. Cf.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121
S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) ("[T]he
country is not confronting anything like an epidemic
of unnecessary minor- offense arrests."); Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (noting that during
a traffic stop, a motorist expects to answer some
questions and perhaps receive a citation, but "that in
the end he most likely will be allowed to continue
on his way"). As we have noted many times, a
typical traffic stop resembles in character the
investigative stop governed by Terry more closely
than it does a custodial arrest E.g., United States v.
Botero-Ospina, 71 FJd 783, 786 (10th Cir.1995)
(en banc). We see no compelling reason to depart
from this en banc court's previous holding that even
if "an officer's initial traffic stop [is] objectively
justified by the officer's observation of a minor
traffic violation, ... his investigation nevertheless
will be circumscribed by Terry 's scope
requirement." Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 788.Even
if we were to abandon Terry for this type of traffic
stop, we are convinced we would still apply a scope
requirement since, as indicated by the Supreme
Court, the Fourth Amendment constrains the scope
of all searches and seizures. E.g., Royer, 460 U.S.
at 499-500, 103 S.Ct. 1319.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop based
on probable cause must be judged by examining
both the length of the detention and the manner in
which it is carried out. We therefore reject the
government's assertion that, because Officer
Tucker's questioning about weapons did not extend
the length of the stop in this case, there was no
Fourth Amendment violation.
III.

The second issue we must address is whether to
adopt a bright-line rule allowing an officer
conducting a traffic stop to ask the driver about the
presence of weapons, absent reasonable suspicion
that the driver may be armed and dangerous. For
the reasons that follow, I believe we should reject
the government's invitation to adopt such a rule in
this case.
The "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis
"is always 'the reasonableness in M231 all the
circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen's personal security.' "
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98
S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terryf
392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868). "Reasonableness,
of course, depends 'on a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.' " Id. (quoting United States v. BrignonU
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45
L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Because of "the fact-specific
nature of the reasonableness inquiry," the Supreme
Court has generally "eschewed bright-line rules" in
the Fourth Amendment context. Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347
(1996).
Consistent
with
this
framework,
officers
conducting traffic stops may "take such steps as
[are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal
safety." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235, 105 S.Ct. 675.
"For example, they may order out of a vehicle both
the driver ... and any passengers," "perform a
'patdown' of a driver and any passengers upon
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous," "conduct a Terry patdown' of the
passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous
and may gain immediate control of a weapon," and
"even conduct a full search of the passenger
compartment, including any containers therein,
pursuant to a custodial arrest." Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113, 117-18, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d
492(1998).
Applying the reasonableness inquiry in this case,
"we look first to that side of the balance which
bears the officer's interest in taking the action that
he did." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109, 98 S.Ct. 330. It
is important to emphasize at this point that the
government has never attempted to argue, and
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indeed cannot argue, that Officer Tucker reasonably
suspected that Holt may have been armed and
dangerous. At no time during the suppression
hearing did Tucker testify that he believed Holt to
be armed or otherwise dangerous, or that he was
concerned for his safety; indeed, he testified that he
did not "remember feeling threatened" by HoitApp.
at 44. In granting Holt's motion to suppress, and in
response to the government's argument that Officer
Tucker was justified in his inquiry about the
presence of weapons in Holt's vehicle to insure the
officer's safety, the district court made the following
factual findings, none of which the government or
the majority has established are clearly erroneous:
Trooper Tucker did not testify that he had any
suspicion that Defendant was armed and
dangerous to justify his question regarding the
presence of firearms. Similarly, Trooper Tucker
did not testify that he was subjectively in fear of
his safety or apprehension of physical harm from
Defendant. Objectively, Defendant was seated in
Trooper Tucker's OHP cruiser, at a police traffic
checkpoint, surrounded by additional police
officers. These circumstances do not give rise to
any apparent risk of harm to Trooper Tucker or
any other officer that was present. As a result,
this Court finds that officer safety could not and
did not justify Trooper Tucker's questioning.
Dist. Ct. Order at 7-8.
Although Tucker's limited knowledge that Holt was
a drug trafficking suspect perhaps could have
afforded him with a reasonable suspicion that Holt
was armed or dangerous, see, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 864-65 (7th Cir.1999)
(indicating that officer who stopped suspect for
traffic violation had reasonable suspicion that
suspect might be armed and dangerous due, in part,
to officer's knowledge *1232 of FBI surveillance of
the suspect's vehicle as a possible part of a
large-scale drug operation), Tucker did not indicate
this was the case, and there is no other evidence that
would allow us to reach such a conclusion.
Tucker's actions during the stop are also consistent
with the conclusion that Holt did not represent a
safety threat. For example, Tucker did not attempt
to pat down Holt when he ordered him out of his
vehicle. Further, the evidence indicates Tucker
placed Holt in the patrol car because that was his
routine practice with male detainees (although that
routine practice may have originated out of safety
concerns, there was no evidence on that point).
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim

Finally, in seeking Holfs consent to search the
vehicle, it appears that Tucker was not interested in
locating the weapon for safety purposes, but rather
was interested in determining if Holt had violated
Oklahoma state law. App. at 42 (Tucker testified he
was interested in checking the weapon to "make
sure it [wa]s loaded or that there [wajs a violation,"
thereby allowing him to "issue a citation or take the
subject into custody").
In lieu of reasonable suspicion, the government
asks us to recognize that an officer faces significant
dangers each time he or she conducts a traffic stop.
In other words, the government asks us to adopt an
approach similar to the one followed by the
Supreme Court in Mimms and Wilson, two cases in
which the Court was willing to announce bright-line
rules governing traffic stops.
In Mimms, two police officers on routine patrol
observed an individual driving an automobile with
an expired license plate. After stopping the vehicle
for the purpose of issuing a citation, one of die
officers ordered the driver out of the car and asked
him to produce his driver's license. When the driver
did so, the officer "noticed a large bulge under [the
driver's] sports jacket" and, "[f]earing that the bulge
might be a weapon, ... frisked [the driver] and
discovered in his waistband a [loaded] 38-caliber
revolver." 434 U.S. at 107, 98 S.Ct. 330. Although
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that it
was constitutionally impermissible for the officer to
order the driver out of the vehicle, the Supreme
Court held otherwise. Despite the fact that "the
officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the
... driver at the time of the stop," the Court
concluded that the officer nonetheless faced two
specific safety risks. Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330. First,
the Court emphasized "the inordinate nsk
confronting an officer as he approaches a person
seated in an automobile." Id. Second, the Court
noted the potential "hazard of accidental injury
from passing traffic to an officer standing on the
driver's side of [a] vehicle." Id at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330.
The Court ultimately concluded that these safety
risks outweighed what it described as the "de
minimis" intrusion on personal liberty caused by the
officer asking the driver to get out of his vehicle. Id.
In Wilson, a Maryland state trooper observed an
automobile being driven over the posted speed limit
and without a regular license tag. The trooper
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

264 F.3d 1215
2001 DJCAR4452
(Cite as: 264 F3d 1215)

Page 16

pursued the car and, as he did so, observed two
passengers in the vehicle, both of whom "turned to
look at him several tunes, repeatedly ducking below
sight level and then reappearing." 519 U.S. at 410,
117 S.Ct. 882. When the vehicle finally stopped, the
driver got out and met the trooper halfway. "The
driver was trembhng and appeared extremely
nervous, but nonetheless produced a valid
Connecticut driver's license." Id. The trooper
instructed the driver to return to the car and retrieve
the rental documents, and the driver complied
While the driver was sitting in the driver's seat
looking for the rental papers, the trooper ordered
the front-seat passenger, M233 who "was sweating
and also appeared extremely nervous," out of the
car. Id. at 410-11, 117 S.Ct. 882. When the
passenger got out of the car, a quantity of crack
cocaine fell to the ground, and the passenger was
arrested and charged with possession with intent to
distribute. Prior to trial, the passenger moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that it was
constitutionally impermissible for the trooper to
order him out of the vehicle. The Maryland courts
agreed and suppressed the evidence. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed, concluding that "the rule
of Mimms applies to passengers as well as to
drivers." Id. at 413, 117 S.Ct. 882. In doing so, the
Court noted that the same dangers exist when an
officer approaches a stopped vehicle, "regardless of
whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver
or
passenger."
Id.
Although
the
Court
acknowledged that "the danger of the officer's
standing in the path of oncoming traffic would not
be present except in the case of a passenger in the
left rear seat," it emphasized that the presence of
"more than one occupant of the vehicle increases
the possible sources of harm to the officer." Id.
In my view, Mimms and Wilson do not translate as
readily to the circumstances of this case as the
government suggests. To begin with, it is beyond
obvious that the relative weight of the interest in
officer safety will vary depending upon the
particularcircumstances of each case. E.g., Knowles,
525 U.S. at 117, 119 S.Ct. 484 ("The threat to
officer safety from issuing a traffic citation ... is a
good deal less than in the case of a custodial
arrest."); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330
(recognizing "the inordinate risk confronting an
officer as he approaches a person seated in an
automobile," as well as the "hazard of accidental
injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on

the driver's side of [a detained] vehicle"). Thus, in
considering die reasonableness of specific police
conduct we must focus sharply on the context in
which die conduct occurred in order to identify the
particular risk(s) posed to officer safety.
Here, unlike Mimms and Wilson, we are not dealing
with the beginning stages of a traffic stop.
Therefore, we are not confronted with "the
inordinate risk[s]" that exist when an officer
approaches a "person seated in an automobile," or
with the "hazard of accidental injury from passing
traffic to an officer standing on the driver's side of
[a stopped] vehicle." [FN6] Mimms, 434 U.S. at
110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330. Our focus instead must be on
the risks that Officer Tucker faced when he posed
his question about loaded weapons, i.e., as Holt sat
in the squad car while Tucker finished writing a
warning for Holf s seatbelt violation. Viewed more
genetically, we must determine what types of risks
exist near the conclusion of a routine traffic stop,
including those that exist when a driver is allowed
to return to his car and leave the scene.

FN6. The fact is that Officer Tucker
considerably neutralized any such risks by
ordering Holt out of his truck and into
Tucker's vehicle. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at
111, 98 S.Ct. 330.

On this point, the evidence is, to put it generously,
quite meager. It is uncontroverted that Officer
Tucker never broached the subject in his testimony
during the suppression hearing, and the government
never submitted any other evidence on this point to
the district court. Thus, we are left with the
government's citations to Mimms and Wilson, and a
handful of general crime statistics independently
uncovered by the majority. Although the majority
is willing to afford great weight to its statistics, I am
unwilling to do the same. In taking this stance, I
acknowledge that the Supreme Court relied on
M234 general crime statistics in Mimms and Wilson.
That reliance is much more understandable in my
view, however, since the Court in those cases was
assessing the risks that exist at or near the outset of
a traffic stop, when the driver and/or occupants are
still in their vehicle and the outcome of the stop
remains unknown.
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Given the lack of real evidence, I am inclined to
conclude that the safety risks existing at the
conclusion of a routine traffic stop (i.e., one not
ending in an arrest) are significantly lower than at
the beginning of such a stop. I draw this
conclusion, in part, from the Court's statement in
Wilson "that the possibility of a violent encounter
stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist
stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact
that evidence of a more serious crime might be
uncovered during the stop." 519 U.S. at 414, 117
S.Ct. 882. If, as here, a traffic stop is about to end
with the mere issuance of a ticket or warning (or
with no official action), then I submit the safety
risks are low, since the driver will be less concerned
at that point "that evidence of a more serious crime
[will] be uncovered." [FN7] Id.

FN7. For these same reasons, it is
conceivable in my view that Officer
Tucker's
questioning
about
loaded
weapons and other contraband actually
increased, rather than reduced, any
potential safety risks.

I now turn to the second part of the reasonableness
equation, which requires us to identify the
individual interests that are implicated when an
officer asks a driver about the presence of weapons.
On this point, the majority curiously focuses only
on the individual interests of defendant Holt, or
more accurately, what it perceives as the
nonexistent individual interests of defendant Holt
Citing an Oklahoma statute that makes it "unlawful
for any person to fail or refuse to identify the fact
that [they are] in actual possession of a concealed
handgun pursuant to the authority of the Oklahoma
Self-Defense Act" when they come into contact
with a law enforcement officer during a traffic stop,
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 21, § 1290.8(C), the majority
suggests that Holt "had no reasonable expectation ...
of keeping private the fact that he was carrying a
loaded weapon behind the passenger seat of his
vehicle." Maj. Op. at 1222. Although this analysis
is quick and convenient, I question whether it is
correct. The majority cites no cases in support of
its proposition, and my own review of relevant
Supreme Court cases suggests the majority's
position is unprecedented. See generally Minnesota
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142

L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("If
the illegality of the activity made constitutional an
otherwise unconstitutional search, such Fourth
Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent
only, would have little force in regulating police
behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty.").
If the majority's analysis were correct, then why
wouldn't a similar conclusion be reached regarding
a driver's possession of illegal drugs? In other
words, because state and federal law make it illegal
to possess various types of street drugs, then
wouldn't a driver lack any reasonable expectation of
keeping private the fact that he was carrying such
drugs in his vehicle? Moreover, the majority's
analysis ignores the broader view, including those
situations where a driver is either lawfully carrying
an item that could be brandished as a weapon, see
generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1061,
103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("An individual can lawfully possess
many things that can be used as weapons. A
hammer, or a baseball bat, can be used as a very
effective M235 weapon."), or is carrying nothing
that could be used as a weapon.
Although it is admittedly difficult to quantify the
precise individual interests at issue, Supreme Court
precedent strongly suggests that a driver retains
some reasonable expectations of privacy and
security regarding his vehicle and its contents, even
when those contents are illegal. In Long, for
example, the Supreme Court held it permissible for
a law enforcement officer to conduct a "Terry
patdown" of the passenger compartment of a
vehicle if the officer had reasonable suspicion that
the driver was dangerous and might gain immediate
control of a weapon. 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct.
3469. Although the Court did not discuss at length
the individual interests implicated by such
patdowns, it can be inferred from the reasonable
suspicion requirement that the driver of a vehicle
possesses some residual privacy interests in the
interior compartment of a lawfully stopped vehicle,
as well as in the contents of that compartment (even
if those contents include weapons). In other words,
if a driver possesses no such residual privacy
interests, the Court presumably would not have
imposed the reasonable suspicion requirement, and
would instead have allowed such patdowns as a
matter of course in all traffic stops. [FN8]
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FN8. The Supreme Court is not alone in
recognizing that a driver in a routine traffic
stop retains some measure of individual
privacy. This court has likewise held that
a driver retains an expectation of privacy
in his or her vehicle and its contents.
United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1553
(10th Cir.1993). Indeed, we have held that
this expectation of privacy extends to
secret compartments within a vehicle, even
though such compartments "are most often
used to conceal narcotics, weapons, or
large amounts of cash.'* Id. at 1554. As
we noted in reaching this conclusion, if a
person's expectation of privacy in his
automobile "is to be protected at all, there
appears to be no reason to treat searches of
secret compartments within the vehicle on
any different basis than searches of the
glove compartment or trunk." Id.

Balancing the two parts of the equation against
each other, I conclude that the individual privacy
interests implicated by the government's proposed
bright-line rule outweigh what I perceive to be the
very minimal safety risks that exist at or near die
conclusion of a routine traffic stop. Thus, I reject
the government's proposed bright-line rule because,
in my view, it is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
Because the majority reaches a different conclusion
and agrees to adopt the proposed bright-line rule, I
find it necessary to highlight what I believe are
some additional flaws in the rule. Aside from the
fact that the rule flies in the face of the Supreme
Court's general distaste for bright-line rules in the
Fourth Amendment context, it is unprecedented in
its breadth. In virtually every case in which the
Supreme Court has been willing to announce a
bright- line rule governing routine traffic stops, it
has been careful to closely tailor the new rule to
match the facts before it See Wilson, 519 U.S. at
414, 117 S.Ct. 882 (authorizing officer to order
passengers out of vehicle); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768
(1981) (authorizing full search of passenger
compartment pursuant to a custodial arrest);
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330 (authorizing
officer to order driver out of vehicle). Here, in
contrast, the rule has only a minimal connection to

the facts before us, and is so broad that it apparently
applies at any stage of a routine traffic stop.
Despite its breadth, I am not convinced that the rule
will do much to reduce the safety risks faced by
officers conducting routine traffic stops. As it now
stands, existing precedent affords officers a number
of measures to "protect themselves*1236 from
danger." Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117, 119 S.Ct. 484.
As a matter of course, an officer can remove a
driver from a vehicle. If an officer reasonably
suspects a driver may be armed and dangerous, he
can frisk the driver and/or conduct a "patdown"
search of the passenger compartment. The question
is therefore what, if any, protection the rule affords
an officer in those situations where he does not have
a reasonable suspicion that the driver of a stopped
vehicle may be armed and dangerous (since those
are presumably the only situations where the officer
would have to resort to questioning the driver about
weapons, rather than simply conducting a patdown
of the driver and passenger compartment).
According to the majority, most drivers will answer
truthfully if asked about the presence of loaded
weapons. This is a dubious assumption in my view,
at least in those situations where the driver is
considering using a weapon against the officer.
Moreover, by authorizing questions only about
"loaded weapons," the rule affords virtually no
protection in those situations in which a driver
possesses an unloaded weapon and ammunition,
since the driver can truthftdly answer "no" to the
officer's question. Finally, although I agree that a
question about loaded weapons can perhaps provide
an officer with clues about a driver, I am also
concerned that the question can, at least in some
instances, create the possibility of violence where it
otherwise did not exist
IV.
Having rejected botfif of the government's
arguments, I am left with the conclusion that Officer
Tucker's question about weapons was unreasonable
and violated the Fourth Amendment. The question
remains, however, whether Holt's consent to search
was nevertheless valid. "A search preceded by a
Fourth Amendment violation remains valid if the
consent to search was voluntary in fact under the
totality of the circumstances." United States v.
Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir.1994); cf.
United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th
Cir.1996) (noting that "voluntary consent may be
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given by a person who is detained"); United States
v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1557-58 (10th Cir.1993)
(holding that a defendant's consent to a search of his
vehicle was voluntary even though police officer
was in possession of defendant's license and
registration at the time the officer requested consent
to search). "The government bears the burden of
proving the voluntariness of consent, and that
burden is heavier when consent is given after an
illegal [detention]." Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 881. "If
the consent is not sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint of the illegal detention, ... it
must be suppressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' "
United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th
Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d
1444, 1453 (10th Cir.1989)). Three factors are
relevant to the determination of whether a detainee's
consent was an act of free will: "the temporal
proximity of the illegal detention and the consent,
any intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the
purpose and flagrancy of the officer's unlawful
conduct" Id. at 818 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416
(1975)). Because the district court did not address
this issue, I would remand the case to the district
court for findings on the issue of the voluntariness
of Holf s consent See Walker, 933 F.2d at 818.

HENRY, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I join with Parts I and II of Judge Briscoe's opinion
in concluding that non- consensual police
encounters should continue to be measured by the
parameters of *\231Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny,
which specifically means that die government must
demonstrate that an investigative detention "was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration" Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct 1319, 75
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (emphasis added).
However, I join in Parts I and II of Judge Ebel's
opinion, with the following caveats: (1) In Part I, I
do not agree that questions of travel plans are
before us and thus I express no opinion on whether
travel plan questions are within the scope of all
traffic stops; and (2) I agree with Part II's holding
that there is a narrow exception afforded during
traffic stops to inquire about the presence of
firearms, in the interest of officer safety. I am not

convinced that the statistical data upon which Part
II relies is dispositive, but considered in the context
of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct.
330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) and Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct 882, 137 L.Ed.2d
41 (1997), I am persuaded that a narrow
officer-safety exception is appropriate. Indeed,
local state law enforcement must make their own
determinations about whether or not the interests of
ensuring officer safety are furthered by asking about
the presence of firearms.
To restate, in my view, we are declaring a narrow
personal safety exception to the Terry scope and
duration: During a valid traffic stop, officers may
ask the occupants of the vehicle about the presence
of loaded firearms. In my opinion, this questioning
would also extend to ask about the presence of
unloaded weapons, for the risk of violent response
to either is similar. See McLaughlin v. United
States, 476 U.S. 16, 17, 106 S.Ct 1677, 90 L.Ed.2d
15 (1986) (affirming lower court's conclusion that
petitioner's unloaded gun was a " 'dangerous
weapon' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)
"); United States v. Boyd, 924 F.2d 945, 948 (9th
Cir.1991) (noting that unloaded weapons, like
loaded weapons "instill( ] fear in victims and
bystanders, creating the risk of violent response");
United States v. Benson, 725 F.Supp. 69, 73
(D.Me.1989) (recognizing "that the display of such
a [unloaded] weapon instills fear in the average
citizen and creates a danger that the unloaded
weapon may evoke a violent response from police
or others") (internal quotation marks omitted). In
addition, as the government suggests, this narrow
exception would not run afoul of Fourth
Amendment limitations "as long as such
questioning does not prolong the duration of the
stop or alter its fundamental character as a Terry
-type detention." Govt's Petition for Reh'g En Banc
at 11; see id. at 14, 88 Si€t. 1868.
Finally, and most importantly, we reiterate the
practical implications of such questioning and the
elicited response: First, "the detainee is not
obligated to respond. And, unless the detainee's
answers provide the officer with probable cause to
arrest him, he must then be released." Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct 3138, 82
L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (footnotes omitted). Similarly,
as the majority points out, a "refusal to answer
furnishes no basis for an arrest although it may
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alert the officer to the need for continued
observation."* Terry, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868
(White,
J.,
concurring).
Any
"continued
observation" must be tempered by the scope and
duration requirements of Terry. See INS v. Delgado
466 U.S. 210, 216-17, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d
247 (1984) (notmg that the "Fourth Amendment
imposes some minimal level of objective
justification to validate the detention or seizure," in
the face of a refusal to respond). Similarly, as the
government acknowledged during oral argument, in
the face of a negative response, any further
detention must be supported by reasonable
suspicion. See *1238United States v. Soto, 988
F.2d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir.1993) ( "Whether such
an investigative detention is supported by an
objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity
does not depend upon any one factor, but on the
totality of the circumstances.").

PAUL KELLY, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part
I concur in Judge Ebel's opinion in its entirety, but
write separately to emphasize my dissent from Part
II of Judge Briscoe's opinion in light of the en banc
court's disposition of the officer safety issue.
Having decided that an officer may ask a stopped
motorist whether there is a loaded firearm in the car
even in the absence of particularized suspicion, it is
totally unnecessary for the en banc court to decide
whether Terry stops are constrained only in terms of
duration, and not in terms of scope. See United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5tfa
Cir.1993). Because the case must be remanded for
additional analysis under the officer safety
rationale, it is at best premature to decide the outer
limits of permissible questioning in these
circumstances, and at worst completely advisory
and inappropriate. There is nothing in the record,
other than about the firearm, to support the
far-ranging implications contained in Part II.
Moreover, no facts yet establish that Officer
Tucker's questioning unrelated to officer safety
resulted in the statements or evidence sought to be
suppressed. While it is true that Officer Tucker
asked about Holt's drug history, the questions were
posed after the questioning about the loaded firearm
and in response to Holt's volunteering that he did

not use drugs anymore. ApltApp. at 42-43.
Thereafter, Holt gave consent to search. [FN1] Id.
at 43. Nothing in this record suggests that Holt's
providing information about his previous drug use
had anything to do with his consent. Officer Tucker
went to the loaded pistol behind the passenger seat,
id. at 45, and a local officer went to the camper,
looked in and found a white powdery substance. Id.
at 47. Casesmust be decided (and read) against
their facts. Here, we are announcing a Fourth
Amendment rule in search of facts.

FN1. Although Holt testified that he never
told Officer Tucker that he had a loaded
firearm in the car and that he did not
consent to a search, the district court
rejected this testimony as incredible.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge
SEYMOUR joins, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
Having joined Judge Briscoe's opinion in its
entirety, I write separately to emphasize two points.
First, Officer Tucker stated in the suppression
hearing that he did not "remember feeling
threatened" by Holt prior to asking Holt about the
presence of a loaded weapon in the car.
(Appellant's App. at 44.) Thus, the only direct
evidence we have as to the officer's particularized
suspicion to justify the interrogation is that there
was none. Had Officer Tucker expressed a concern
about his safety, we would review to determine
whether that concern was reasonable under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968), and that would end the matter. Given the
officer's lack of concern for his own safety, I think it
inappropriate to reach out and create law that but
for the en banc nature of these proceedings would
essentially be dicta.
Second, the law in this Circuit, and the eventual
conclusion of the en banc court, is that traffic stops
are governed by the standards laid down in Terry.
See, e.g., United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d
1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998); *\239United States v.
Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 1997).
"[Wjhere [a police officer] has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual," the officer may undertake "a reasonable
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search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
Courts will defer "not to [the officer's] inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled
to draw." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has
explicitly held that, upon an articulable and
reasonable belief the motorist is potentially
dangerous, a police officer may search the interior
compartment of the car that has been stopped.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103
S.Ct 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). However, a
police officer may not search a car during a traffic
stop without such suspicion. Knowles v. Iowa, 525
U.S. 113, 119, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492
(1998).
Allowing the police in this case, and in all future
cases in which there is no particularized suspicion,
to interrogate stopped motorists as to the presence
of loaded weapons is contradictory to the rule laid
down in Terry. The average American citizen
stopped for speeding while hurrying to drop
children off at school will not only find it bizarre,
but more than minimally intrusive, to be confronted
with questions about loaded weapons. It seems
extraordinary to me that we, as a court, are
arrogating unto ourselves the right to alter the
clearly established Supreme Court precedent in
Terry, and are thereby eroding the constitutional
rights of American citizens. If the jurisprudence of
the United States Supreme Court is to be altered,
that task belongs to the Court itself. See Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S.
533, 535, 103 S.Ct 1343, 75 L.EA2d 260 (1983)
(per curiam); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358,
1363 (7th Cir.1996) ("[T]he Supreme Court has
told the lower federal courts, in increasingly
emphatic, even strident, terms, not to anticipate an
overruling of a decision by the Court; we are to
leave the overruling to die Court itself." (citation
omitted)).

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I join parts I and II of Judge Briscoe's opinion. In
particular, I fully agree with Judge Briscoe that the
analytical framework set forth in Terry applies to
traffic stops, even those based upon probable cause,
and that Terry requires an analysis of both the scope

and the duration of a stop to determine whether an
officer's actions during the stop comported with the
Fourth Amendment.
Although the issue is not addressed in Judge
Briscoe's en banc opinion, in the panel majority
opinion authored by Judge Briscoe she expressed
doubt whether questions relating to a detained
motorist's travel plans were appropriate in light of
Terry's scope requirement. See United States v.
Holt, 229 F.3d 931, 937 (10th Cir.2000). In her
majority opinion for the court, Judge Briscoe has
declined to reach the issue, noting that the issue is
not implicated by the facts of this case.
Nevertheless, in a portion of his opinion joined by
three other members of the en banc court, Judge
Ebel has now suggested that questions regarding
travel plans are always within the scope of a traffic
stop. See Opinion of Judge Ebel at 1221 ("Travel
plans typically are related to the purpose of a traffic
stop because the motorist is traveling at the time of
the stop.").
Although I concur in the majority's decision not to
definitively decide this issue, I feel compelled to
offer the following observations regarding the
approach advocated in Judge Ebel's opinion. For
those reasons cogently stated by Judge Ebel in his
*1240 panel dissent, I disagree that questions
relating to travel plans are related to the purpose of
a roadside traffic stop. See Holt, 229 F.3d at 942
(Ebel, J., dissenting) ("When a car is stopped for
speeding or for a straightforward traffic violation,
as opposed to being stopped on suspicion that the
driver is falling asleep or driving erratically (in
which case the officer would be legitimately
concerned with how much further the driver
intended to travel), it is difficult to explain how
questions concerning the travel plans of the
occupant
are
reasonably
related
to the
circumstances which justified the stop."); id.
(Ebel, J., dissenting) (describing questions relating
to travel plans as "wholly unrelated to the purpose
of the stop"). Judge Ebel's en banc opinion offers
no convincing rationale for the abandonment of his
previous analysis of this question and its
replacement with a one-size-fits-all rule holding that
questions regarding travel plans are invariably
within the scope of a traffic stop. Furthermore, in
light of the fact that Holt was never asked any
questions regarding his travel plans, this is an odd
case within which to advocate such a rule. In the
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words of Judge Kelly, it appears that Judge Ebel
and those who have joined his opinion are
suggesting "a Fourth Amendment rule in search of
facts " Opinion of Judge Kelly at 1238.
Although I disagree with Judge Ebel's suggestion
that questions regarding travel plans are always
related to the purpose of a traffic stop, I nonetheless
am of the view that facially innocuous questions,
including those relating to travel plans, are proper
during a routine traffic stop as long as they do not
extend the duration of the stop. In my view, Terry 's
scope requirement is a common sense limitation on
the power of law enforcement officers. It prevents
law enforcement officials from fundamentally
altering the nature of the stop by converting it into a
general inquisition about past, present, and future
wrongdoing, absent an mdependent basis for
reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.
The scope doctrine does not, however, prevent
officers from engaging in facially innocuous dialog
which a detained motorist would not reasonably
perceive as altering the fundamental nature of the
stop. Accordingly, I do not think it necessary to
suggest that questions about a detained motorist'
travel pians are invariably related to the purpose of
the stop in order to conclude that they are proper
under ferry
I join parts III and IV of Judge Briscoe's opinion in
then: entirety. I agree with Judge Briscoe that the
bright-line rule adopted by the majority allowing
law enforcement officials to routinely ask about the
presence of weapons during a traffic stop is
inconsistent with the scope requirement set out by
the Supreme Court in Terry and is unnecessary to
ensure officer safety. I ftirther agree with Judge
Briscoe that no reasonable officer would have
feared for his safety at the time Officer Tucker
asked Holt about the presence of weapons.
264 F 3d 1215, 2001 DJCAR 4452
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